Publication Date:
2010
abstract:
In OECD countries SOEs cover a significant economical and social role. However, SOEs raise some
issues. They present inefficiencies and low profitability, related to their poor corporate governance, in
particular with respect of the board’s role. Ownership is a key variable underlying different corporate
governance regimes, but very few empirical studies investigate the influences of state ownership on
board’s composition. Two attributes are particularly relevant: board independence and competence.
The paper aims at highlighting: (1) the components that assign a critical role to a SOE’s board; (2) the
specificities of independence and competence in a public governance perspective; (3) the effects of the
ownership structure on these attributes. Hypotheses are tested on a sample of 29 firms of the 30
Italian SOEs directly managed by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance.
issues. They present inefficiencies and low profitability, related to their poor corporate governance, in
particular with respect of the board’s role. Ownership is a key variable underlying different corporate
governance regimes, but very few empirical studies investigate the influences of state ownership on
board’s composition. Two attributes are particularly relevant: board independence and competence.
The paper aims at highlighting: (1) the components that assign a critical role to a SOE’s board; (2) the
specificities of independence and competence in a public governance perspective; (3) the effects of the
ownership structure on these attributes. Hypotheses are tested on a sample of 29 firms of the 30
Italian SOEs directly managed by the Italian Ministry of Economics and Finance.
Iris type:
1.1 Articolo in rivista
Keywords:
board composition; board independence; board competence
List of contributors:
Gnan, L; Hinna, A; Monteduro, F; Scarozza, D
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